Fundamentals of Auxiliary Organization
I often see bravado-laden posts on internet forums, composed by those who have begun to realize that their ability to potentially run-and-gun with a paramilitary guerrilla force, if they ever existed, were lost somewhere in the hazy past of memories of drinking, chasing girls, and watching television. These posts tend towards the melodramatic, along the lines of, “I can still pull a trigger once or twice, and that’s all you need!” In light of the ignorance, however apparently noble, of these virtual gestures, I offer Mosby’s Maxim #938, “If you can’t be a G, be the Auxiliary.”
The Appleseed Project’s question, “Rifleman or Cook?” with its implication that that being anything less than a heart-breaking, life-taking, knuckle-dragging, soul-stealing, mankiller of a gunslinger, is obviously inferior, is a demonstration of ignorance of the reality of armed conflict, both now and throughout history. The fighting force of an insurgency is just one element of the resistance, and arguably the least important.
The modern United States military has a massive tooth-to-tail ratio. I’ve seen credible sources, throughout my career and since, that range from 1:20 to 1:100. Regardless of the specific numbers, it’s indicative of the overwhelming support echelons necessary to keep fighters in the fight. While this is often derided by armchair commando, who like to incorrectly, point out that historical resistance movements didn’t have the “luxury” of a support network, the reality is, no historical or modern unconventional force has ever succeeded without a large, organized support network. This organization is referred to as the auxiliary. If your organization, whether a local community defense group, or an actual paramilitary guerrilla force training to resist the further encroachment of our natural rights, does not possess an organized auxiliary, you are, in a word, fucked.
The auxiliary is most simply defined as that part of the population that supports the aims of the resistance, and participates in the resistance through active, willing, support activities for the guerrilla force or the subversive underground. The auxiliary is composed of part-time volunteers who have value to the resistance largely because of their position within the community. This is because the support activities of the auxiliary should most often be limited to those activities that can be explained by their normal activities (for example, a machinist would provide support by manufacturing weapons parts or weapons, not by suddenly trying to score a black market shipment of medical supplies from a smuggler. A physician however, might very well be able to explain his need for those medical supplies through his occupation, rather than trying to procure a new 5-axis milling machine, even if he was a hobby machinist).
It is critical that no one ever make the mistake of thinking of the auxiliary as a separate or, God forbid, an inferior organization. Rather, the auxiliary should be considered, and treated, as members of the network who simply fulfill a different role. The fact is, in many ways, the auxiliary not only plays a more important role, but its members are often at the greatest risk of compromise, capture, and death. Auxiliary members continue their role in the “normal” daily life of their community. This means that some of their activities must be performed “after hours,” leading to sleep deprivation and increased stress which can lead to self-compromise through slips of the tongue, or being in a place they shouldn’t be, at a time they shouldn’t be. The auxiliary is the easiest arm of a resistance to infiltrate, due to their proximity to their neighbors, and the need to bring more people into the auxiliary for certain mission requirements. Additionally, the auxiliary is often used as a testing arena for potential recruits to the guerrilla force and/or the subversive underground, meaning agents of the regime will be in contact with the auxiliary far more often than with the guerrilla force or the underground.
The auxiliary is normally organized to correlate with, or parallel, the existing political administration. This is NOT the “shadow government,” however. Instead, this means that each auxiliary cell is responsible for its neighborhood, community, town, county, or state. This is ideal, because it means that the members of the auxiliary are intimately familiar with the physical and human terrain of their operational area. They know, or should know, who sympathizes with the resistance, and who are closet collaborators. On the other hand, this also increases the potential exposure of the auxiliary members, especially in small communities, or tightly-connected neighborhoods, where it is normal for “everyone to know everyone’s business.”
Security for auxiliary networks is primarily derived from two different methods: compartmentalization, and operating under cover. The reality is, the second of these is the most important. Members of the auxiliary should always be able to explain away their activities, easily and fluidly, by their normal daily activities. A machinist stockpiling bar stock that he may later be able to turn into suppressors? A physician with stored antibiotics? A farmer with extra feed corn for his animals? A police officer who accidentally misplaces one magazine of 9mm or 5.56mm ammunition every time he goes to the qualification range? A truck driver who happens to have his “brother-in-law/cousin/old high school buddy” riding with him on his route? A teenager skateboarding down his street that happens to front the security force offices?
Beyond having a readily explicable cover for auxiliary activities, it is important to compartmentalize auxiliary operations. There are two basic types of cellular structures in resistance organizations that have historically been proven to work: parallel cells and cells-in-series (sounds like some science fair shit, huh?). Parallel cells generally perform the same task, providing multiple sources for whatever service those cells provide. Parallel cells gathering intelligence information may be a way to ensure that at least one cell manages to get accurate information out on enemy activity. Parallel communications cells may provide secondary and tertiary ways to ensure that critical information makes it to the guerrilla force or underground.
Cells-in-series however, provide a division of labor for the accomplishment of functions, such as manufacturing, evasion networks, propaganda distribution, and logistics disbursement. In a cells-in-series organization, the tasks assigned to one cell will transition or carry over to the next cell(s), in order to accomplish the function in its entirety. For instance, cell A, a group of 10 farmers, purchase an extra half-ton of feed corn each, for a total of five tons. They drop the excess off at a designated location and notify the cell leader. The cell leader then notifies HIS superior, the branch leader, who notifies the leader of cell B. B’s cell leader then has the two truck drivers that constitute his cell pick the corn up and deliver it to a different location. He notifies he branch leader when it’s there (so it’s no longer at risk of compromise from any of the farmers being turned). The branch leader then notifies cell C, who shows up, packages the corn for caching, and establishes the caches. C’s cell leader then notifies the branch leader that the caches are in location, and the locations of the caches. The branch leader then notifies the area command of the locations of the caches. If an element of the guerrilla force is operating in the area and needs a re-supply of corn for feeding the personnel within the Guerrilla Base Area Complex, they can be notified of the location, and then proceed to recover the caches. The same principle may apply to ANY logistics materials, from weapons to munitions, to medical supplies. The same underlying principles apply to moving personnel through a transportation network.
The key to security when using cells is that members of individual cells, even at the cell leader level, do not communicate directly with one another, but through the branch leader, or his intermediaries. This maintains the personnel security that compartmentalization provides.
Missions of the Auxiliary
The Guerrilla S-4
While the auxiliary has many roles to play, the most commonly recognized role is that of the “guerrilla S-4.” From the procurement of necessary goods and materials on the black market, to the manufacture of restricted items, to the establishment of caches, one of the primary missions of the auxiliary is always going to be getting the guerrilla force the things it needs to continue the fight. While many readers will immediately think of things like ammunition, weapons, food, and medical supplies, they are unnecessarily limiting their contributions. ALL classes of supply should be covered by a resistance auxiliary: computers, printers, paper, and ink. Ink pens and notebooks, socks, shoes, and clothing, vehicle repair components; even such mundane materials as building supplies such as nails and hammers can be used to construct shelters for the guerrilla force in the guerrilla base camps of the base area complex.
Not all logistics supply support operations need to be procurement-based functions. The manufacture of necessary items, from weapons and munitions in your home workshop or your machinist shop, to the raising of foodstuffs, fulfill a necessary role in the “guerrilla S-4” mode. The ability to transport those items, from one part of your area to another plays a role. Do you drive a pick-up with camper, or an SUV? Are you a CDL commercial driver? Have you taken the time to drive every county road, two-track, and logging trail in your county and the surrounding counties? Have you mapped them out and determined where good hide sites along the way are?
Intelligence Collection Assets
The collection of operational intelligence for the guerrilla force and/or underground is a critical role for the auxiliary member to play. Doing so of course, requires an understanding of what constitutes military operational intelligence. The final mission of any resistance movement is to destroy the regime’s ability to project force. I’ll say that again. The final mission of any resistance movement is to destroy the regime’s ability to project force. It doesn’t matter what the politicians say. It doesn’t matter what laws they pass. It doesn’t matter what speeches they make. All that matters is, do they have the ability, through their surrogates, to project the force of arms outward, in order to enforce those edicts?
The final mission of any resistance movement is to destroy the regime’s ability to project force. The more we know about the regime’s ability to project force, the easier that mission becomes. Intelligence assists us in the prosecution of the mission because it tells us what the enemy is capable of doing, where he is capable of doing it, and when he is capable of doing it. Intelligence information gathered by you, as a member of the auxiliary, whether procured randomly in the course of your day, or priority information requirements, the need for which is communicated to you by the area command, through your branch leader and cell leader, is critical to the underground and the guerrilla force, in order to prosecute their end of the fight effectively.
Intelligence is derived from information the auxiliary gathers. Until it has been analyzed and verified, it’s not intelligence, just information. Useful information may include specific details about the enemy, possible or actual, the weather, or the terrain.
Intelligence is information that has been analyzed for veracity, and compared to other information, in order to determine its meaning. “I saw a tank driving down Hwy 299 yesterday,” plastered across the internet, is NOT intelligence. It’s information. Did the poster REALLY see a tank? Or was it a Stryker? An MRAP? A fucking Suburban?
“I saw a train go through my town loaded down with armored military vehicles!” on an internet forum is not intelligence. It’s information. Did the train really exist? Did it really have armored vehicles on it? Let’s assume yes. So, what was the purpose behind the transportation of those vehicles? Were they being transported to be used against the American civilian populace? Or, were they being transported so that a unit stationed in the woodlands of Ft. Campbell, KY could get some training in an alpine desert environment like Ft. Carson, Colorado, before being deployed to Afghanistan? Or, were they being shipped to a DRMO site for demilitarization, to be sold off as obsolete/worn-out?
“Well, they were painted woodland camouflage! They couldn’t have been going to Afghanistan!” Well, okay….unless they haven’t been re-painted for deployment yet…Or, they will be returned to Ft. Campbell, following the train-up, and the Rakkasans will be using vehicles already in country in Afghanistan, in order to reduce the cost of the deployment to the taxpayers….
(Editorial Note: I’m not saying that shit doesn’t go on. I’m saying, consider the implications of what your information MIGHT mean. If A can equal B, or equal C, but it usually equals B….don’t jump to the conclusion that it suddenly MUST equal C. Don’t discount the final option either though.)
One of the most important issues of information collection that members of the auxiliary must consider is that they cannot let their prejudices, beliefs, or theories, interfere with their collection of information. Unless your cell is specifically tasked and trained as analysts, you don’t need to, nor should you, try and analyze the information you come across.
Within any resistance organization, whether the auxiliary, the underground, or the guerrilla force, there will be S-2 sections. Their job is to collect the information the auxiliary gathers, the information the guerrilla force gathers, and the information the underground gathers. Then, they put all of that information together, determine how it all fits together, and then develop an intelligence picture for the combat commanders (guerrilla and underground).
The primary objective of intelligence gathering is to help combat commanders, at all levels, make good decisions. The patrol leader needs good intelligence to determine where he can set his ambush up, and if he’s going to have enough people in his patrol to execute the ambush mission. The area commander needs to know what capabilities the enemy has, to determine if he can effectively send out patrols to conduct raids, or if he needs to limit his operations to simple ambushes, or even just random sniper ambushes. The auxiliary, by discovering the information that the S-2 needs, can help determine this information for him.
The second step in the troop-leading procedures for operational planning, next to “receive the mission,” is for the operational commander to develop an estimate of the situation, using the METT-TC analysis. Without reliable, accurate information, an accurate estimate cannot be made. This means good planning cannot occur. The operational leader may make a piss-poor decision, because he had bad information. The ability of the auxiliary to provide accurate, timely information for development by the S-2 is one of the absolute most critical roles the auxiliary can play.
The second objective of intelligence gathering is to help conceal the resistance’s plans and objectives from the regime. This may range from not being discovered conducting reconnaissance activities on or near certain objectives, to not letting the enemy know who is conducting the information gathering. A member of the auxiliary, who happens to have a day job working inside the security force compound may be able to not only gather more specific information on the operations within that facility than a guerrilla force surveillance patrol, they may be able to do so with less chance of compromise.
There are two basic aspects of information that the S-2 may ask the auxiliary intelligence-gathering cell to produce (technically, the military aspects of the weather forms the third, but between the internet and the Weather Channel, the need for the auxiliary to procure this information may be negligible in the coming activities). These include information about the military aspects of the terrain, and the military aspects of the enemy.
Military aspects of the terrain are described by the acronym OAKOC. Observation and fields of fire, Avenues of Approach, Key Terrain Features, Obstacles (natural and man-made), and Cover and Concealment. The ability of the auxiliary to get close to, or even inside, the enemy’s positions will provide a far better look at some of these than even the best guerrilla force surveillance patrol’s ability.
Military aspects of the enemy are described by the acronym SALUTE. Size, Activities, Locations, Unit/Uniform, Times, and Equipment.
(This is not an article on combat intelligence, but on the role the auxiliary plays, so we’ll leave those alone for now)
So, what are you doing today, to play your part in the auxiliary in gathering information? Are you studying the terrain in your area for the military aspects? Do you know where future guerrilla forces can move through your area with minimal signature to the regime? Do you know what locations would make good hide sites for guerrilla camps? If I showed up on your doorstep at midnight tonight, could you lead me to them?
Have you spoken with local police officers to determine which will do the right thing, and which will do as ordered? Do you know where the arms room is located in your local National Guard armory? Do you know what kind of equipment your local police department or your local NG unit has in its inventory? Not what you read on the internet, but through hands-on, real-world information gathering? (I know, I know, it’s fuck-all easier to sit on the internet and read shit off different “news” sites than it is to go talk to people….)
The Resistance Recruiter
A third critical role of the auxiliary is that of the recruiter. All images of used car salesmen military recruiters aside, this is also one of the absolute most critical roles in a resistance movement and one that can really only be effectively accomplished by the auxiliary. From identifying people with the right belief system and sympathies, to the actual approach and sales pitch, someone has to recruit new people. Equally important, someone has to vet them and determine their trustworthiness. The auxiliary member, approaching a new person for the first time, may or may not know that person outside of the resistance activities. If they do know the target individual, from their daily activities, they may be putting themselves in more danger than any guerrilla in a gunfight, if that person ends up being an agent of the regime, or an inactive sympathizer with the regime.
Other roles the auxiliary may play are no less critical, nor less dangerous. Information dissemination in the form of propaganda (which will better reach the minds of the undecided civilian population? The message shared by their next door neighbor the grocery store manager they see every day, or the message delivered by the dude they’ve never met, but who’s in their yard, with “machine guns” and LBE, with an M4 or Kalashnikov in his hands?) or serving as couriers for communication networks can be obviously dangerous. Serving as a transportation facilitator in a transportation network for either logistics or personnel can get you shot dead or incarcerated at a vehicle control point.
Finally, the auxiliary may occasionally be called upon, in a part-time role, to provide active participation in paramilitary operations by the guerrilla force. This may be as simple as filling a security or blocking position during an operation, or providing a support-by-fire element for a raid that requires a larger assault element than the guerrilla band can manage, while still providing support-by-fire. Don’t get your panties in a wad, and don’t discount your need to know how to run your guns and shoot, move, and communicate, just because you recognize you don’t have the physical ability to live in the mountains and patrol into town to conduct raids and ambushes.
Don’t beat yourself up because you’re not CSM Billy Waugh. Don’t beat yourself up because your asthma precludes you from kicking in doors and shooting motherfuckers in the face. Stick to what you’re capable of, and know that you’ll still be providing an essential service to your community’s defense.
“If you can’t be the G, be the auxiliary.”