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Cellular Construction: A Basic Introductory Primer

September 4, 2013


(The previous article, from an anonymous member of the Special Forces community, led me to decide to put together a short article on cell construction for undergrounds, and how it can be done within your community, for community defense purposes. This has been discussed in depth in several classes, as time allowed within the program-of-instruction, or when specifically requested by a participant..–JM)



One of the pre-supposed greatest weaknesses of irregular force organizations is the obvious risk of compromise by aggressor forces. The ability to grab-and-bag a single member of an organization, thus leading to all other members of the organization being rolled up easily, through the exploitation of interrogation, rightfully tends to scare the ever-loving-fuck out of many people. This historically led to the fatally-flawed concept of “Leaderless Resistance,” purportedly developed by US Army Colonel Ulius Louis Amoss, a former intelligence-branched officer and rabid anti-communist in the 1960s, as a back-up to organized resistance operations in the event of an invasion by the USSR. While I certainly don’t know the (presumably-late) colonel, I would guess that, as a professional, his hypothesis was, in a resistance against an outside invader, the missing leadership and core mission would be provided by the shared goal of ejecting the invader.


The concept was re-vitalized and popularized amongst the denizens of the WN movement by that paragon of virtue (PLEASE, PLEASE note the sarcasm) and rational though, Louis Beam. The problem with this approach was still “solved” by the presumably shared commitment to resist against the government.


For community defense considerations in the current world however, there are numerous issues with the concept of leaderless resistance is the lack of shared information, and all the other issues pointed out in the previous article. We’ll stay away from that in this instance, and focus on how cells can be developed in a rational, intelligent manner that provides maximum security and operational functionality.


For the purposes of this article, I’m going to steal a page from American Mercenary and semi-fictionalize this, or at least turn it into a semi-narrative….fuck, I don’t know the right terms to use.


The Leadership Cell


Somewhere in Montana, in a small community (not that there are a whole lot of large communities in Big Sky Country) of 5000-10,000 people, a group of buddies have been talking and training together for several years, preparing for the troubles that all of us can see coming. As the world becomes more dangerous, they begin to realize that their six families aren’t going to be able to do much besides struggle for a subsistence level existence. No opportunity to restore Constitutional Rule-of-Law in their community, or provide help and hope for their neighbors, when all they will have time to do is struggle to grow, gather, and store food and provide inadequate security for their little retreat position.


We’ll call them Bob, Bill, Ben, Bert, Brian, and Brad (ain’t alliteration fun!?). The B-Boys decide that they need to start expanding their organization, providing training for other people, and providing the ability for themselves to have an expanding belt of security around their families, in order to enhance their preparedness. After all, being intelligent guys, they recognize that security is more effective, the further out you can project force away from your HQ facility. They’re also, like most people, concerned about security of the organization and not ending up renditioned to some shit-hole prison in Syria, under the control of US-sponsored Al-Qaeda operatives posing as anti-regime freedom fighters.


As they discuss it amongst themselves and their wives, one of the wives comes to the intelligent conclusion (I don’t know about your family, but in mine, HH6 has ALL the brains. I’m just the brawn) that they should base it on a cellular construction as they expand the network.


The problem of course, is they all have friends and associates, outside of The Group, but they don’t necessarily know the preparedness-oriented leanings of those friends and associates, and they are concerned about blindly bringing outsiders into contact with The Group.


They decide, based on the advice of Bert’s brother Bud, a retired Special Forces Sergeant-Major, that they need to develop independent cells, based on their local networks of friends and neighbors.


In other words, Bob has friends and associates that the rest of the B-Boys aren’t familiar with, or aren’t familiar enough with to call “friends” or have a predisposition to trust enough to discuss such topics with. In reflection, each of the other B-Boys similarly has friends and associates that aren’t known to, or aren’t familiar with the others of the group, or Bob. Likewise with their respective spouses.


So, each of the B-Boys assigns themselves a role, or is assigned a role, within the group. Bob, being a local cop, knows not only all the cops and security guys in the area, but also many of the local gun guys. He decides, or has it decided for him, that he will work on developing direct-action security cells. So, Bob heads out, and over the course of the next several months, independent of the rest of the group, starts three or four groups, or joins three or four groups, of paramilitary-centric preparedness cells.


Bill meanwhile, being a local wheat farmer, starts talking to his friends and associates in the local farming community about preparedness, and ensuring they have enough crops in the ground to feed all the local folks. In doing so, he begins to realize that most of those guys not only have wheat and other feed crops, but large trucks and trailers. So, Bill doesn’t only start food-based logistics cells, but a transportation cell that help with escape-and-evasion operations by moving evaders out of the immediate operational area.


The list, obviously goes on, based not just on vocation, but also on avocation and social networks. The members of Bill’s subordinate cell don’t need to know what other cells Bill has developed, and shouldn’t. Likewise, Bob’s cells don’t need to know what Bill’s cells are, or even that Bill exists, and vice versa.


If the self-appointed leadership cell decides that an operation needs to be conducted, they determine that Bob’s Direct-Action (DA) cells will conduct a raid. In the conduct of their raid, one member of the cell is severely wounded.


Fortunately, because they took a cellular approach to their organization, they have a transportation network in place, so after stabilizing the casualty, they leave him in a pre-determiend rally point location, and leave. A member of the transportation cell stops by and loads up the casualty, then drives him to another pre-determiend location, close to, but not proximate to, a safe house. The driver drops off the casualty and leaves. A member of the medical cell then stops by the location, picks up the casualty, and moves him to the safe house, where the medical cell is able to provide advanced medical care to heal the casualty.


The cut-outs between cells provided by temporarily dropping the patient in rally points, provides security from compromise from cell to cell.


Within the cells, there is the obvious risk of compromise if one member is captured or turned. Only to his own cell and cell leader however. The obvious extension of this is that if one of Bill’s cells is compromised, Bill may be compromised, leading to compromise of the entire leadership cell, and then top-down, the entire organization.


There are four basic solutions to this potential problem.


  • ensure that, once operational, the leadership cell is secured. This is where the concept of a secure guerrilla base area becomes paramount. It’s one thing to have an operational cell compromised and give up the name or identity of a leadership cadre. It’s something else entirely to leave that leadership cadre in a place or position where he/she is susceptible to capture that puts the entire organization at risk (it is important to recognize that this is not saying that the leadership should remain isolated and not contribute deliberate action and efforts).
  • Use aliases and disguises when working with subordinate cells. Unfortunately, in a local, community-centric effort, this is completely unworkable, since it reduces the efforts to build rapport and a community-centric organization.
  • If someone is captured, there needs to be a way to allow his/her cell to know within hours that he has been compromised, allowing them to disperse and disappear into the underground, as well as stopping/destroying operations that the detainee may be privy to information about. This is an effective method, but may be unrealistic.
  • Sit home, shut up, and do whatever you’re told by your betters in the bureaucracy, already.


Ultimately, you need to understand that, as scary as compromise and capture by hostile elements is, if you’re basing all of your decisions and planning solely on that fear, you’ve already died. Do what is necessary to be effective, be as safe and secure as you can be, while still being effective, and drive the fuck on already, accepting the fact that, we’re all dead, and we don’t get to choose the time. All we get to do is choose how we’ll be remembered.




From → Uncategorized

  1. Hognutz permalink

    Bless you and all you do Msaby!

    • Hey brother! Assuming this is who I think it is, you don’t need to be thanking me. If I know anything about these subjects, it’s because of mentors like yourself.

  2. karl permalink

    Found elsewhere, more fuel for the fire:

    Covert Cell Networks, building, operating, maintaining.

    A Covert Cell Network is necessary for the operation of a covert resistance movement against a totalitarian regime. Most people in America think of the French Resistance of World War II as the model. While that is to some degree a valid model, few would be able to explain in detail how it worked, and why it worked, and how the Germans were unable to unravel it in detail. It is worth noting that Al Queda is also a valid model of how a Covert Cell Network can operate – and after a decade of intense US Intelligence Forces focused on it, the actual map of that network has been effectively cracked, and is in the process of being unraveled in detail. Even if the network continues to operate, the key leadership and organization that existed prior to 2001 has been killed or captured. The French Resistance only had to operate for at most five years (1940-1945).
    “I can just get all my friends together, come up with neat codenames, and then go out and build a resistance from that, right?”
    You do that, and it is only a matter of time until the regime rolls you all up in one fell swoop. Guerrilla Warfare/Resistance Movements/Unconventional Warfare has to go in phases. You cannot skip straight to launching a coup d’état or Restoration of the Republic with you and your drinking buddies or pool league. There have been famous attempts at such. Members were killed. Leaders jailed.
    “Ok, what about leading a pitch-fork and torch wielding mob to storm the Bastille/Capitol/Reichstag/Parliament/State House/Town Hall/VFW post?”
    Some of those have actually happened. Context and preparation is important to understand. The French didn’t just get up one day and decide to storm the Bastille, no matter how much they may cling to it as a national myth. It took preparation, organization, and time to get from “Let them eat cake” to heads quite literally rolling in the streets.
    “Ok. Where do I start?”
    As Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt said upon realizing that they had landed in the wrong place on Utah Beach on D-Day: “We’ll start the war from here!” You’re convinced, right? You realize things are going pear shaped, right? The Constitutional Republic has been effectively overthrown/The One True King has been forced into hiding/The Aliens have taken over/You aren’t going to get tickets to the Super Bowl this year. You aren’t alone in this, right? You know like-minded people right? Friends who agree with you? Good. If you are all alone in thinking these things, you might want to consult a therapist/cleric/deity (greater or lesser)/your mother. Odds are exceptionally good if any of the above has in fact happened, you are not alone in recognizing this. Speaking it may be dangerous. Acting on it more so. Wars may be fought for broad concepts of ideologies and nations. Battles are fought for the buddies in the foxhole next to you, or pinned down behind some cover just a few meters away. You go to war as a patriot, but you fight as friends/buddies/brothers. This is where you start. With your friends and confidants. Problem is, ARE they your friends? Are they your confidants? CAN they be trusted?
    Peer Networks
    Peer Networking is mostly thought of from a computing realm. Different computers on the same network are “peers” to each other. Each has the same “authority” on the network as the next. Communication is “peer to peer”. Social Networking sites map this style of networking into human social interactions. If we had a network that encompassed everyone, you could (the argument goes) get a message FROM anyone TO anyone in six steps (six degrees of Kevin Bacon ring a bell?). While the actual numbers may be argued, that’s the big idea. If you’ve ever played on social networking sites, you can learn a great deal about your “friends” networks, and even friends of friends. You no doubt have found some of your friends and family’s comments/posts on such sites to be horribly offensive/idiotic/irritating/infuriating/comical. Probably NOT a good idea to plot the resistance against the Lizard People on Facebook.
    Trust No one Someone.
    We all know the X-Files catchphrase “Trust no one”. All well and good. Except if you want to get something accomplished. What’s the point of an underground to return the One True King to the throne if you aren’t going to work with anyone? So, at the very start, you have to trust SOME one. Just one. Not just anyone. You have to pick very carefully. If merely speaking to the wrong person what you have come to realize means you wind up in the reeducation camp, or disappeared into the gulags, you can’t just grab someone off the street or from your fraternity and confide in them at random. Pick carefully. Feel them out over time. Gauge their positions, their potential dedication to the cause. A mistake at this point is potentially a fatal blow to your involvement in the cause (to get your super bowl tickets, right?), if not outright fatal.
    So you have someone you can trust with what is the most important, dangerous secret you may ever have. Great. You have now entered the realm of being a co-conspirator. Congratulations. Depending upon your circumstances, this may now make you a felon/enemy of the state/enemy combatant/insurgent. First question, once you both trust each other this far, are either one of you ALREADY part of a resistance network? If so, great! Welcome to the network (there are a few caveats that will need to be addressed). If not… well that’s why I said “we’ll start the war from here.”
    Expanding your network
    Some simple rules.
    • Nobody gets added to the network without two members agreeing to it.
    • Everybody gets a codename of some variety (yet more caveats…). If Brian and Matt are the initial pair, and they want to add Steve, that’s fine. Now Brian, Matt, and Steve are in the network. And they all know each other. When Matt and Steve want to add Garry, but Garry doesn’t know Brian, he shouldn’t know Brian except by a codename that has no connection to who Brian is in public – just who he is in the network. This is why you see popular culture references to “Agent Falcon” and “Number 3” and “Agent K” and the like. So, we give Brian the codename Falcon, Matt the codename Eagle, and Steve the codename Raven. When Garry is added, he is referred to by his codename Owl. Owl and Falcon never meet, and only know each other by their network codenames, and only communicate though network members they know (in person, or via whatever mechanism they were brought into the network. Beware of internet only introductions – they are very easy to spoof/fake).
    • Limit each member’s connections (Two connections is too tight, Falcon, Raven, and Eagle each take up two connections each just to add Eagle by mutual agreement of Falcon and Raven. Eight connections is too many – if one of the group get caught/is a plant/turncoat, then everyone who knows that member gets taken out as well – 7 more nodes. This is how you unravel a cell network. Al Queda notably had some large cells, opening up large groups to capture. Five to six connections is a happy medium between robustness and risk.
    • New members are not introduced around the network. They are mentioned only through channels, and only by codenames.
    • Certain capabilities can only be performed by groups of people who already know each other (an 8-man team is not going to sneak into the alien mothership in any kind of coordinated fashion if they have never worked together before, let alone even met). When such groups are formed, they need to be treated as a single node in the network, and Ops Node (or similar). One of them gets found out, the whole group gets found out, etc. so the risks to them are much higher – plus sneaking into the alien mothership is an inherently risky proposition, the likelihood is that one or more of them won’t be coming back, so limit the number of connections in/out of an Ops Node.
    • Communication is relayed from node to node to node. Because every node has at least two connections (unless there is damage to the network), one channel is primary. Secondary channels are only to be used if the primary is down (use of a secondary channel is indication that the primary is lost/unavailable/compromised/now a pod person). In our above example, Owl talks to Falcon via Eagle. If Eagle is eaten by the lizards, Owl and Falcon communicate via Raven. The very fact that each is hearing from the other by the secondary channel tells them that the primary is gone.
    • NO ONE IS TO KNOW THE NETWORK LAYOUT! If any node knows more than their contacts to the wider network, they know too much about it. The truth is, the Regime/Aliens/False King/NFL Commissioner will know far more about the topology of the actual network than the members. If Owl knows who Falcon is, Owl can give up Falcon (everyone cracks, it’s just a question of when – you cannot give up what you do not know). Owl and Falcon could even work with each other and know each other in public, but they cannot know that they are in fact Owl and Falcon in the network. Owl knows how to reach Falcon in the network. Falcon knows how to reach Owl. That’s all they need to know about the layout. Anything more gives the Regime/Aliens/NFL/NCAA too many chances to pick apart the network. Remember, lives are quite literally on the line, as is the cause.
    • When a node is lost (Eagle got picked up by the regime/eaten by the lizards), all nodes that know Eagle have to report along all their channels that Eagle is gone; and for the network to discard all messages for/from Eagle (caveats on reconnecting – what if Eagle was simply on the run, not actually nabbed?)
    So, now you have a basic network running. You are all keeping to 5-6 connections per person, except for Ops Nodes, right? Everyone has codenames. No new members are being added unless two members agree to add that member, right? Remember, with each new member, the odds that it’s a Lizard/NFL Rep/Regime Plant increase. With each new member, the number of people in the network increases, as does the overall risk of detection. It’s not just YOUR life on the line, it’s the life of everyone you know in the network (and in the real world possibly as well). It’s the CAUSE on the line. It is important that the network expand, but carefully (Especially early). As time goes on, the natural growth of connections will start a rapid expansion (or the regime will become effective at rolling it up, and we’re all doomed anyway).
    At some point, if the network grows sufficiently, it will start bumping into itself. I will reference one of the early questions “Are either one of you already part of a network?” When that happens, you have successfully created a link between branches. It is possible, if not likely, that multiple parallel networks will exist. Bridging these networks is important, even if they are very different in origin/style. Only together can we get our courtside seats/repel the alien invasion/return the King to the throne. News of these bridges needs to be disseminated through the existing network.
    Do Something
    So, we have a network or series of networks of like-minded people. We’re all talking to each other through these covert channels (You aren’t talking openly about it in a Starbucks where the Praetorean Guard happens to frequent, are you? You aren’t posting these in public chatrooms on the internet are you? You ARE passing these covert messages via some form of face-to-face or strong digital encryption right? Right? If you are using electronic communication, you are destroying your logs, right? You aren’t doing this via plaintext in email, or keeping them in Gmail, right? RIGHT? RIGHT?) Remind me to put something together about basic computer security/encryption – but in the short-term, if you don’t understand what I’m talking about – keep it face-to-face. Not phone. Not chat. Not email. Face to face, in private, or dead-drop. (maybe I need to add some info on covert comms, ya think?).
    So, now what? We just sit back talking to each other and wait for things to fall our way, right? NO. We have to DO something. What, that is up to the network to decide. Don’t take unilateral action. Discuss it at least with some other members of the network (who may discuss it with more). If you advertise a capability, be sure you can deliver. If it is a one-shot-and-done, make sure that it is known that you have one press on this button and you are done. Time may come that it is needed. Be sure you can deliver. The whole system may depend upon you doing what you said you can do. You may have to pay the ultimate price to do it.
    Any resistance network worth its’ salt will lose members for various and sundry reasons. Some will be rounded up by the Lizard People or Collaborators. Some will be killed doing something dangerous. Some will be scared off for some reason. Some, and these are the most dangerous, will be plants (or will become plants). There is a joke that most of the members of some Mafia organizations were actually undercover Feds from different offices all trying to find out everything they could on what turned out to be other Feds with a cover story. In networking terms, the loss of a node is “damage.” This is where having double-link connection allows for immediate repair of any one lost node. A new backup link will have to be created – with the caveat that you don’t want to increase the links of neighboring nodes above critical thresholds. A dead node is just a dead node. The dead tell no tales… except in the digital age others can step into the digital footprints of the dead – unless the critical information is only in the head of the dead node (passwords, pincodes, dead drop locations, etc.). A captured node, on the other hand, can be interrogated. Everything they know can be extracted (you really think they’re not going to torture you to get information out of your head that can help bring down the resistance? Everyone breaks. Everyone). Breaking takes time, however. So, regular communication between nodes should be frequent enough to detect that a given node has gone off-line unexpectedly, give some warning that it may have been compromised/turned. If a node KNOWS that a neighboring node has been compromised, the warning can be sent to the whole network.
    What’s this about plants? Wouldn’t the green leaves and potting soil give them away? That would be great… but the real world doesn’t work that way. A plant that stays and collects information is very, very dangerous to the network. Part of the defense against this is that no nodes relay the real identities of the any node to any other node. IF a node is a plant or undetected they will only be able to reveal the real-world identities of the nodes they directly interact with (if you’ve been following the rules, that should be no more than 5-6 connections – bad, but survivable for a robust network). Use of PGP Encrypted messaging system would be ideal. With public and private key encryption, messages can be passed through intermediaries without the intermediary being able to read it and relay it to the authorities. While there are rumors of backdoors that the Feds can use, I have never heard that from someone who actually understands cryptology. There is also a large PGP infrastructure that exists in the world that can be used to support such a comms system. Many email clients already support PGP encryption (Thunderbird, for example) and are a good choice for secure comms. Limiting the information intermediary nodes can actually use is vital to limiting the damage of a plant or a turncoat. The real hazards that remain from such are from being involved in operational planning/analysis. As such, they have to actually know the subject matter being discussed (not just an intermediary), thus they can relay this to the authorities. This is why careful vetting of potential members is so critical, but plants WILL find their way into a successful organization. Members WILL become turncoats, even after coming through in the clinch (ref. one of the Hero’s of the Revolution, Benedict Arnold). Careful with the paranoia however, as you have to trust each other in the network, and too much paranoia will see everyone turn on each other. You have to trust that the network as a whole will detect leaks, plants, and turncoats, and start to bypass them.
    Covert Communication Techniques
    We have a network, we know how to build it, how to manage it, how to protect it, and how to repair it. Now, how do we actually communicate on this network? Just use your iphone to call Brian, but use his codename Falcon? Not a chance. Think Cell Phones are secure means of communication? How about land lines? Surely computers are secure, right? Ask anybody who works in the Cyber Security field, and they will tell you that the average user is already screwed. If you use your computer to talk over a network or phone-line to another computer, it can be monitored. Even robust security only gets you so far, but by-and-large the biggest problem with computers is the Dancing Bunnies Problem:
    “What’s the dancing bunnies problem?
    It’s a description of what happens when a user receives an email message that says “click here to see the dancing bunnies”.
    The user wants to see the dancing bunnies, so they click there. It doesn’t matter how much you try to disuade them, if they want to see the dancing bunnies, then by gum, they’re going to see the dancing bunnies. It doesn’t matter how many technical hurdles you put in their way, if they stop the user from seeing the dancing bunny, then they’re going to go and see the dancing bunny.
    There are lots of techniques for mitigating the dancing bunny problem. There’s strict privilege separation – users don’t have access to any locations that can harm them. You can prevent users from downloading programs. You can make the user invoke magic commands to make code executable (chmod +e dancingbunnies). You can force the user to input a password when they want to access resources. You can block programs at the firewall. You can turn off scripting. You can do lots, and lots of things.
    However, at the end of the day, the user still wants to see the dancing bunny, and they’ll do whatever’s necessary to bypass your carefully constructed barriers in order to see the bunny
    We know that user’s will do whatever’s necessary. How do we know that? Well, because at least one virus (one of the Beagle derivatives) propogated via a password encrypted .zip file. In order to see the contents, the user had to open the zip file and type in the password that was contained in the email. Users were more than happy to do that, even after years of education, and dozens of technological hurdles.
    All because they wanted to see the dancing bunny.”
    So, at the risk of being repetitive, don’t try to see the dancing bunnies. You can keep a computer reasonably secure, so long as you never connect it to anything else. But, who wants to go back to the pre-internet days, right? Well you do if you want to be secure in the use of covert networking. Keep another computer as your “dancing bunnies” and internet surfing computer. Continue to watch youtube videos with your iphone or android. Just don’t use them for in-network communications. Generate your content on a standalone computer that you keep with an encrypted hard drive (don’t know how? The internet does. If you don’t understand what the Internet is telling you, don’t use a computer for this). Pass your messages encrypted on a CD or thumb-drive that is only used on your in-network system (thumb drives are much easier to use in a dead-drop than a CD, but both have good roles). Putting your in-network thumbdrive on your regular internet computer means you just gave a virus to everyone else on the network, and possibly just gave the whole real-world identity of the network to the authorities. DON’T DO IT! THIS MEANS YOU!
    So, without computers and telephones, we’re back to REALLY OLD SCHOOL techniques. Benefit of these is that the rumored NSA sniffing/tracking systems won’t work. Draw back is, they are low bandwidth.
    • The Dead Drop – is the practice of securing a package of information (encoded, of course) in a public space such that it is unobserved, and will only be found by the designated person to retrieve it. A classic example is to attach the package to the underside of a postal box, and to leave an otherwise innocuous mark somewhere else (Newspaper on a park bench, a certain window left open, etc. etc. etc. The limit is your imagination). The other party will see the indicator signal and retrieve the package. A given dead-drop should not be used for bi-directional communication. This needs to be pre-arranged by both parties involved, but neither party actually has to know who the other is.
    • The Live Drop – the converse of the dead drop, both parties meet face-to-face to exchange information. This has the benefit of not leaving information in a public place, but has the drawback of having to meet in person. This can be a meet-in-passing (akin to pick-pocketing), or an actual meeting that both attend, or anything in between (ever see someone carrying a briefcase or other lockable case walk into a Wendy’s, order a small frosty, then sit at a table waiting for someone else, who joins him later, and then leaves with the case? It happens. Have you seen it?)
    • Remote Messaging – Once you have something encrypted and ready to send, you can use regular email to send the encrypted blob (either as an attachment or in-line). Not sure how to do this? Don’t.
    • Disaster Signal – use this to indicate that you have been made, or that you are going rabbit. This tells everyone who knows this signal that they are not to trust your regular routes as they may have been compromised.
    Look them up. There are plenty more out there. This is not intended to be a full FM on how to perform each and every possible task, but an intro level guide into things to think about and research. This is a beginning, not the full instruction manual. Much of it will be written by you as you go along, as these things always have been.

  3. Koldsteel permalink

    JM- awesome post as usual.

    Karl- thank you for that post as well.

  4. Man-Bear-Pig permalink

    Respectfully, here is the reality…

    Iraq, Afghanistan and the “War On Terror” have educated Big Brother in how to identify and roll-up ANY network. Centralized, decentralized — a hybrid between the two — it doesn’t matter.

    Snowden (who is a patriot in my opinion) has shown us that even visiting this blog to read this post has created a trail between you and I. My ip and meta-data is logged. With that IP they now can pull up my daughter’s Facebook account and find a picture of her daddy.

    Man-Bear-Pig listens to Mountain Guerilla. Therefore I must be a Patriot (big P). A constitutionalist. A rabble-rowser. One likely to start throwing tea into a bay. Someone to be watched more closely…

    If the Nazis could round up thousands of partisans in France WITHOUT all the analytical and electronic tools they have now — imagine what they could do tomorrow!

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